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Post-regulation effect on factors driving environmental disclosures among Chinese 
listed firms 
Abstract 
Purpose: This study re-examines the factors that affect the level of Environmental Information 
Disclosures (EID) following the issuance of the “Environmental Information Disclosure Guidelines 
for Chinese Listed Companies”.  
Design/methodology/approach: The study is underpinned by stakeholder and legitimacy theories. 
Level of EID was measured for 100 Chinese companies using a scoring system and content analysis 
of their annual reports. The study explored the effect of ownership structure, managerial 
shareholding, economic power and industry classification on the level of EID using panel 
regression. 
Findings: The study revealed that with clearly spelt out guidelines, Chinese companies are 
prepared to disclose environmental information regardless of their economic power. We find that 
the overall level of EID in China remains lower when compared with developed economies. The 
findings are robust across several econometric models that sufficiently address various endogeneity 
problems. 
Originality/value: This paper contributes to the existing literature by using new and updated data 
to re-examine the factors that affect the level of EID among Chinese listed companies. The study 
is important and timely as it covers the period of 2014 - 2016 which is after the Chinese government 
strengthened the enforcement of EID. It highlights the effects of new regulations and underscored 
areas that still require government attention to foster effective environmental protection.  
keywords: China, Environmental disclosure, Legitimacy theory, Stakeholder theory, Post-
regulation 
 
 
1. Introduction 
This study explores the ways in which new environmental regulations affect Environmental 
Information Disclosure (EID) by listed companies in China. EID has become an efficient way to 
communicate with stakeholders and an essential research area in the last decades with most of such 
studies focusing on developed countries (Adelopo and Yekini, 2018).  
Over the last twenty years, China has begun to experience high GDP growth. In 2011, the total 
GDP in China reached 5.93 trillion US dollars, with China overtaking Japan and becoming the 
second largest economy in the world (Wang et al., 2015). The rapid growth of Chinese economy 
with the resultant environmental deterioration, led the Chinese government to implement policies 
that could encourage companies to disclose environmental information (Meng et al., 2013). The 
disclosure was initially made compulsory only for companies causing pollution under the 
regulation of the National Environmental Protection Agency (NEPA), while other companies were 
encouraged to disclose voluntarily (Hu and Karbhari, 2015). The implication was that only few of 
such companies voluntarily disclosed environmental information in their annual reports as against 
what is found in developed countries (Hu and Karbhari, 2015). For example, Baboukardos (2018) 
observed the moderating effect of well spelt-out regulation on EID for French companies and 
encouraged the adoption of same for other countries. The new government regulations in China 
among other things therefore, placed a lot of pressure on Chinese listed companies to disclose 
environmental information (Meng et al., 2013).  
The aim of this study is to examine the extent to which the new regulations have motivated 
EID among listed companies in China and to generate deeper insights on the status of the level of 
EID generally both after the regulations and in recent years. To date there has been limited work 
on this subject on Chinese market. According to Hu and Karbhari (2015), most extant studies on 
the subject, lack sufficient information and are qualitative in nature. In addition, the data used in 
the few quantitative studies (Liu et al., 2010; Meng et al., 2013; Zeng et al., 2010) found in literature 
is dated and mainly around 2000 to 2008, which was the period when the enforcement of EID 
disclosure was weak in China. In other words, the data does not cover the period when the China 
State Environmental Protection Administration (SEPA) issued “Environmental Information 
Disclosure Guidelines for Chinese Listed Companies” (otherwise known as EID Guidelines), 
which further strengthened the regulation on EID in 2010 (Meng et al., 2013). This study is 
therefore important as it uses the most recent data to re-examine the current situation regarding the 
level of EID by Chinese listed companies.  
This research contributes to the existing literature on EID by using new dataset covering the 
period 2014-2016. Our paper departs from the existing literature on EID as most of them are carried 
out on developed markets where principles rather than rule is the norm. This allows us to show the 
effects of regulations on disclosures and in particular the advantage of a well spelt out guideline. 
The study proceeds in section 2 with a literature review, followed by the study design in section 3, 
result and analysis in section 4 and conclusion in section 5. 
 
2. Literature review  
2.1. Theoretical context 
Legitimacy and stakeholder theories are the two dominant theories for the research of EID. 
While some studies (Campbell, 2000; Cho and Patten, 2007; Yekini et al., 2015) have applied them 
independently, others (Dean and Brown, 1995; Christmann and Taylor, 2001) have jointly 
considered the two theories in their explanation of firms’ practice of social and environmental 
disclosure. Legitimacy theory originated from the interaction between the firms and the society by 
the social contract assumptions (Hu and Karbhari, 2015). The social contract assumption supposed 
that firms and society are bound by an implied contract that legitimize the operations of the firm 
within a society and that failure to meet the expectations of the society may cause the firm to be 
penalized by the society (Deegan, 2002).  
Stakeholder theory (Freeman, 1984), on the other hand, states that the interest of those who 
will affect or will be affected by the firm’s operation should be taken into consideration in decision 
making. These stakeholders, including creditors, consumers, shareholders, employees, suppliers 
and the society at large, can therefore be viewed as people who are interested in company’s 
environmental and societal operations. However, while legitimacy theory is viewed as a kind of 
social dynamics, stakeholder theory emphasizes the potent stakeholders in the social dynamics 
(Belal, 2002), and these two theories tend to be better considered as two overlapping standpoints 
that supply distinct and valuable viewpoints for EID research (Yekini, 2012).  
Woodward et al. (1996) argue that both stakeholder and legitimacy theories view an 
organisation as part of the society, however the two theories focused on different perspectives. 
Yekini (2012:62) assert that while “legitimacy theory looks at the corporation’s contractual 
obligation to society as a whole, stakeholder theory makes a distinction between groups within 
society and recognise that some groups are more powerful than others” and could therefore impact 
greatly on the extent of the firm’s exercise of its contractual obligation as suggested by legitimacy 
theory. Consequently, the two theories can be said to be both complimentary and interlocking. They 
are interlocking in the sense that; they both impact on one another. For example, the pressure from 
stakeholders such as government, consumers, shareholders, employees and so on, necessitated the 
firms desire to fulfil its contractual obligation to the society in the form of environmental activities 
to legitimize its operations. In addition, Yekini (2012) argues that since the power to confer 
legitimacy lies with the society as the stakeholder group, the legitimizing activity e.g. 
environmental activity, must receive their full acceptance and approval before it can achieve its 
legitimizing effect. It is this interlocking of the two theories that inform EID (see Figure 1 for 
illustration).  
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Previous studies (such as Dean and Brown, 1995; Christmann and Taylor, 2001) considered 
the conjoined theory (stakeholder and legitimacy) to explain firms’ practices of social and 
environmental disclosure and divided the factors that can influence the level of EID into internal 
and external factors. The external factors, underpinned by stakeholder theory are; government, 
shareholder, creditor, consumer and supplier, competitor, auditor, manager amongst others 
(Mitchell et al., 1997; Belal, 2002). The internal factors are underpinned by legitimacy theory and 
includes such factors as, firm size, age, profitability, financial leverage, industry, market amongst 
others (Cho and Patten, 2007; Liu and Anbumozhi, 2009). The two theories combined, therefore, 
provide powerful theoretical framework for EID. The conjoined theory revealed that firms tend to 
disclose EID for legitimizing relationships between organization and society (Cho and Patten, 2007) 
to meet society’s/stakeholders’ expectations (Yekini et al., 2017).  
 
2.2. Prior studies on China 
There is a plethora of studies on the determinants of the level of EID of listed companies for 
developed countries such as Australia and New Zealand (Hackston and Milne, 1996; Deegan and 
Gordon, 1996; Brown and Deegan, 1998); USA (Clarkson et al., 2008; Cho and Patten, 2007; 
Freedman and Stagliano, 2008); UK (Gray et al., 1995; Hasseldine et al., 2005; Toms, 2002); 
Continental Europe (Branco and Rodrigues, 2008; Cormier and Magnan, 2003; Gamerschlag et al., 
2010), Asia and other developing countries (Hossain et al., 1994; Huang and Kung, 2010). 
However, only few studies (Zeng et al., 2010; Zhang et al., 2011; Chen and Kong, 2011; Meng et 
al., 2013) exist for China. Most studies on China were conducted at the period when EID was very 
weak in China.  
The first regulation on EID was issued in 2007 by SEPA, requesting companies to disclose in 
their annual reports, information on pollution and action taken by them to protect the environment. 
Prior to this, disclosure was based on companies’ social responsibility consciousness. In addition 
to the SEPA rules, Shanghai Stock Exchange, in 2008, issued further guide requiring all companies 
listed on it, to mandatorily disclose information related to environmental protection. SEPA further 
issued EID Guidelines in 2010 to provide further details on mandatory and voluntary disclosure for 
listed companies. This resulted in more companies disclosing EID since 2010 (Zeng et al., 2010; 
Hu and Karbhari 2015). Especially since violations may result in penalty (Meng et al., 2013). These 
changes have reflected significantly on the level of EID across China.  
Although, several studies have examined post-regulation effect in other countries 
(Baboukardos, 2018; Gintschel and Markov, 2004; Clarkson et al., 2008; Dean and Brown, 1995), 
we expect that post-regulation effect in China will be different because China’s economic setting 
is quite distinct from other countries. China’s regional economies are undeveloped hence regional 
practices regarding EID differs considerably (Zhang et al., 2010). The regulation is expected to 
even out the imbalanced development across the country, thus narrowing regional differences 
(Zhang and Guan, 2009). Furthermore, the focus of this paper is to explore the effect of the new 
regulations on established factors driving EID. Many studies have explored different factors 
affecting the level of EID, such as economic performance (Cormier and Magnan, 2003; Nollet et 
al., 2016), environmental performance (Gamerschlag et al., 2010; Branco and Rodrigues, 2008), 
and ownership types (Meng et al., 2013) amongst others. Our aim is to examine whether the new 
regulations and guidelines influence the extent to which these factors drive EID.  
Ownership structure and EID. Several studies have shown that ownership structure is one 
of the decisive factors influencing the level of EID (Meng et al., 2013; Adelopo and Yekini, 2018). 
However, Firms in China are separated into state-owned enterprises (SOE) and private enterprises 
(non-SOE). There have been more studies (for example, Zeng et al., 2012; Meng et al., 2013; Chang 
et al., 2015) on the performance of EID for SOEs than for non-SOEs. These studies indicate that 
compared with non-SOEs, SOEs have funding and policy support from the government and attract 
more public concerns, hence they are under more pressure to disclose more to their key stakeholders 
consistent with stakeholder theory. However, while Zeng et al. (2012) and Meng et al. (2013) found 
positive and significant relationship between government pressure and level of EID for SOEs, Hu 
et al. (2018) and Chen and Kong (2011) found no relationship. Hu et al. (2018) noted that the this 
could be due to the political legitimacy that SOEs enjoy while Chen and Kong (2011) argue that 
non-SOEs ought to disclose more EID than SOEs since SOEs already have social welfare and 
government support, hence, should be less concerned with reputation management, while non-
SOEs should disclose more to attract investment. This argument contradicts the stakeholder 
theory’s view of a firm. Stakeholder theory predicts that firms will strive to meet the expectation 
of their powerful or highly salient stakeholders (Mitchell et al., 1997; Yekini et al., 2015) which in 
the case of SOEs are the government and the public. Similarly, Meng et al. (2013), in supporting 
their proposed pressure–legitimacy theory, show that government ownership has a positive 
association with EID of SOEs irrespective of the “size of government holdings” (Meng et al., 
2013:220). Moreover, the new guideline for SOEs require SOEs to be more responsive to social 
and environmental responsibility (Li et al., 2013). We therefore expect that, given the new 
regulations and guidelines, SOEs will likely disclose more environmental information than non-
SOEs.  
Managerial shareholdings and EID. One of the postulations of stakeholder theorist is a 
holistic approach to managing firms to achieve good corporate governance. One of the key 
corporate governance mechanisms to achieve this is the alignment of managers’ interest to that of 
the shareholders in order to ensure that managers protect the interest of the shareholders at all times 
(Healy and Palepu, 2001; Chen and Kong, 2011). One such mechanism is equity incentives given 
as one of the remuneration packages of managers. This has the advantage of evoking the manager’s 
interest to the utmost. Thus, managers will devote themselves to their company and focus on the 
financial and social aims to ensure sustainable growth and development of the firm (Yu, 2007). 
However, this may influence corporate disclosure strategies. For example, Chen and Kong (2011) 
found a positive relationship between managerial shareholding and the level of EID. They argue 
that managers who possess shareholdings of a corporation will undertake sustainable development 
and environmental disclosure since they have also become part owners of the firm. Healy and 
Palepu (2001), on the other hand, provided conflicting evidence from extant literature, of manager’s 
behavior to voluntary disclosures where stock option compensation is involved. With Chinese 
context, we anticipate positive relationship between managerial shareholding and the level of EID.   
Economic Power and EID. Economic performance has been widely considered as a factor 
associated with the level of EID (Clarkson et al., 2008; Qiu et al., 2016; Nollet et al., 2016). 
Legitimacy theorist posit that high performing firms are under more pressure to legitimize their 
operations to avoid disruptions (Campbell, 2000; Yekini, 2012). The literature presents diverse 
measurement for economic performance. While some use income growth rate, others use profit 
margin, return on equity and return on assets amongst others. However, some scholars argue that 
the economic power of a firm depend not only on its profitability but also on its solvency (Roberts, 
1992). Hence financial leverage has been used in earlier studies as a measure of solvency and 
financial capability. The advocates of financial leverage (see Roberts, 1992 and Hossain et al., 1994 
for example) argued that creditors who provide loans to firms are powerful stakeholders and could 
demand disclosures of certain information including EID. Roberts (1992) finds a positive 
relationship between company’s debt financing and the level of EID. Hossain et al. (1994) report 
that financial leverage plays an important role in the level of EID as it reflects the solvency of the 
company. However, Cormier and Magnan (2003) found a negative relationship, while Alsaeed 
(2006) found no significant relationship between financial leverage and the level of EID. However, 
since the performance of a firm is closely linked with its solvency i.e. its financial capability (Al-
Tuwaijri, et al., 2004), we combine financial leverage and profit margin as our measure of economic 
power. This is because the costly environmental programs undertaken by firms will depend largely 
on their solvency and financial conditions (Qiu et al., 2016). Consequently, any measure used to 
protect the environment or for energy saving are inseparable from financial capability of the firm.  
Industry classification and EID. Apart from economic power, industry classification has also 
played a crucial role in terms of the studies of EID. Different industries have different 
environmental performance due to their different characteristics (Deegan, 2002; Roberts, 1992). 
Firms with serious environmental pollution have more motivations to disclose environmental 
information for the sake of avoiding any related costs enforced by society and government (Deegan, 
2002; Deegan and Gordon, 1996). Yekini and Jallow (2012) observed that high-profile industries 
tend to make higher level of EID to meet public expectations. However, Alsaeed (2006), found no 
significant relationship between industry types and the level of EID. Branco and Rodrigues (2008) 
in their study of CSR of Portuguese firms found significant relationships. Similarly, Gamerschlag 
et al. (2010) find that firms in the energy supply and consumer industry seem to disclose more 
environmental information than those in service and other industries which is consistent with the 
findings of a recent study by Yekini et al. (2015). In the current study, we explore the issue further 
in a new regulatory environment. We expect the high polluters to disclose more given the specific 
focus of the new regulations on pollution.  
 
3 Study design 
3.1. Sample and data  
The study focused on manufacturing firms chosen from Chinese “A” share in Shanghai and 
Shenzhen stock exchanges for 2014 to 2016. Manufacturing firms are chosen because they produce 
more polluted externalities than other industries. Sample period of 2014 to 2016 was selected to 
obtain insights into the developments and changes in the performance of EID of listed companies 
after SEPA issued EID Guidelines to strengthen the regulation of EID of corporations and to see 
how the issuance of new guidelines on EID for listed companies by the Ministry of Environmental 
Protection (MEP) in 2010 has affected the level of EID.  
To collect data, the list of all listed company from the China Stock Market and Accounting 
Research (CSMAR) database was downloaded. This database is a multi-level capital market 
information database and has all information on the Chinese Securities Regulatory Commission. 
To ensure representativeness, samples were selected from both polluting and non-polluting 
industries. Industries classified as polluting by MEP are petroleum and plastic, chemical, paper 
making and printing, mining, medicine and biological products, drink and food, textile and clothing 
(Zeng et al., 2012). Companies with significant trading losses for the past 2 years and/or with 
negative equity were not included in the sample. This is to avoid abnormality and extreme outliers 
in the sample. Similarly, companies for which all the required data for the analysis could not be 
obtained were also left out. Overall, the sample consist of 100 companies all drawn from the 
manufacturing industry. Financial data for these companies were obtained from the CSMAR 
database, while data for EID were obtained using content analysis from companies’ annual reports, 
sustainability and social responsibility reports. Table 1 below shows the companies based on 
exchange they were listed on.  
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Table 1 also shows a mean EID score of 9.43 for Shenzhen stock exchange and 10.53 for 
Shanghai stock exchange. Indicating that more company on Shanghai stock exchange disclose 
more EID than Shenzhen. A plausible explanation could be because Shanghai stock exchange 
published guidelines for all the companies listed on it on how to implement the guidelines issued 
by State council on strengthening environmental protection. The guideline was also meant to 
encourage all listed companies in China to actively fulfill their social responsibility in protecting 
the environment.   
 
3.2. Model specification  
We specified a fixed effect (FE) panel regression model for our analysis given that our data is 
both cross-sectional and time-series in nature. FE has the benefit of controlling for any time 
invariant unobservable variable. It assumes that such variables are unique to each firm and therefore 
consolidated in the model’s intercept (Greene, 2008). Our model with all the variables is specified 
as follows:  
  EID level𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = α0 + 𝛽𝛽1SOEs𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  +  𝛽𝛽2MAN𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽3LEV𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽4PM𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽5IND𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛾𝛾1SIZE𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖+ 𝛾𝛾2AGE𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 +  𝛾𝛾3ROA𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛾𝛾4SE𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝜖𝜖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖   
          
Table 2 presents the definitions and measurement of the independent, dependent and control 
variables in our model.  
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3.3. The hypotheses 
Following from the literature review in section 2 and the discussions on the determinants of the 
level of EID in China, we formulated the following hypotheses to be tested using the FE model: 
H1: SOEs are likely to disclose more environmental information than non-SOEs. 
H2: Firms with higher managerial ownership are more likely to disclose more EID than firms with 
lower managerial ownership. 
H3: Firms with better economic power are likely to disclose more EID than their counterparts. 
H4: High polluting firms are likely to disclose more level of environmental information than their 
low polluting counterparts. 
 
3.4. Dependent variable measurement 
The dependent variable is the level of EID disclosed. We measure the level of disclosure 
following the guidelines produced by SEPA in 2007 and MEP in 2010. The guideline specifies key 
areas in which EID is necessary. Based on these new guidelines, we identified eight items to 
measure the level of EID. They are presented in Table 3. 
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Content analysis was employed in this study for the collection of EID data. Content analysis 
have been used extensively in previous similar studies on EID (Beattie et al., 2004; Aerts and 
Cormier, 2009; Hooks & van Staden 2011; Yekini et al., 2015). It is defined as a “data collection 
method of codifying the content of a narrative report using selected criteria or decision rules, 
thereby deriving a quantitative scale, which then permits further analysis” (Yekini et al., 2015:255). 
We adopted content analysis in the study because we regard it as an objective and systematic 
technique that would allow for an objective quantitative analysis. This is because it can be used to 
convert textual data into quantitative data through an objective and methodical way (Krippendorff, 
2004). We obtain information on each item by applying a scoring system similar to that adopted by 
Yekini et al. (2015). The score ranges from 0 to 3; 0 being no information is provided on EID in 
company’s annual report and 1 means information provided is non-monetary and general in nature 
such as general description of EID activities; 2 represents specific non-monetary information such 
as detailed plans and goals; while 3 is monetary information in addition to specific and detailed 
plan. The total score of a company could therefore range between 0 and 24. The higher the score 
the greater the extent of information disclosure. Table 4 shows the mean distribution of the level of 
disclosure for each item. To ensure objectivity and consistency, we maintained clear scoring 
instructions and ensured that scoring was done over several months by researchers experienced in 
content analysis-based studies. We also ensured that the alpha coefficient (inter-coder agreement) 
is greater than 85% (Krippendorff, 2004).  
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Table 4 revealed that there are more disclosures on expenditure associated with environmental 
protection (ENPR) with the highest mean of 1.89 while government financial support (GFS) has 
the lowest mean of 0.31. The lower GFS could be an indication that most of the companies have 
no governmental funding on environmental protection.  
 
4 Results and Analysis 
4.1. Descriptive statistics 
Table 5 shows that the level of EID ranges from 0 to 24 with an average of 10.11 during the 
sample period of 2014 – 2016. The findings indicate that the level of EID has largely improved 
compared to the prior studies in China, where the mean value of EID was 1.13 and 3.02 between 
2006 to 2008 in Meng et al. (2013) and Zeng et al. (2012) respectively. On average managers own 
3.9% shares within the firms with a range from 0% to 95%. Leverage ratio (LEV) for many 
companies in the sample is in the region of 51%. While, this is an improvement to the 56% in Meng 
et al. (2013), some having as high as 90% suggest that most of the sampled firms have relatively 
high financial gearing consistent with Zeng et al. (2012). The profit margin (PM), has an extensive 
range from -76.8% to 38.95% with majority of the companies with approximately 6% which is an 
improvement to the 3% in Meng et al. (2013). The Pearson Correlation presented in Table 6, 
indicates low correlation between all the explanatory variables suggesting that multicollinearity is 
not a concern. Notwithstanding we computed the variance inflation factor (VIF) for all variables. 
Our results are below the threshold of 10 for all variables, hence confirming that multicollinearity, 
if at all existing, is of little concern. 
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4.2. Regression results 
SOEs and EID: With regards to Hypothesis 1, the results in Table 7 reveal that SOE have a 
coefficient of 2.594 indicating a strong positive relationship with EID and significant at 1% level. 
The results confirm the H1 that SOEs will disclose more environmental information than non-SOEs. 
The result contradicts the argument by Chen and Kong (2011) but confirms that of Zeng et al. (2012) 
and Meng et al. (2013). Chen and Kong (2011) argue that since the private companies are more 
likely to engage in reputation building in order to attract investment and patronage from the public, 
they are likely to disclose more EID than SOEs. Arguing further that since SOEs are well supported 
they should have less concern with reputation management. In contrast, Zeng et al. (2012) and 
Meng et al. (2013) both argue that SOEs are expected to disclose more since they have more social 
responsibilities than private companies and have more funding and policy support from the 
government. Our findings support this argument which is also in line with legitimacy and 
stakeholder theories.  
MAN, and EID: Hypothesis 2 examined the relationship between managerial ownership and 
the level of EID. The findings in Table 7 show that MAN is significantly and positively associated 
with EID which is consistent with the study by Chen and Kong (2011). More specifically, In Model 
1 of Table 7, MAN has a positive coefficient of 4.964 and significant at 5% but became marginally 
significant with the exclusion of SOE from the equation in Model 2. The plausible reason for MAN 
becoming less significant might be because majority of the SOEs have no manager options since 
their shareholdings comprise mainly of government holdings, while the opposite is the case with 
private firms. Given the fact that the majority of private firms have low level of EID, it’s likely that 
the more the private firms in the sample, the more the existence of manager options and the less 
the importance attached to EID.  
Economic Power and EID: Hypothesis 3 examined the relationship between economic power 
and EID with leverage and profit margin as indicators of economic power. The results in Table 7, 
show both variables as having inverse relationship with EID. The relationship is also only 
marginally significant in both cases. The inverse LEV/EID relationship is not consistent with earlier 
studies (Roberts, 1992 and Hossain et al., 1994) who both found positive and significant 
relationships but consistent with the findings from more recent studies; Cormier and Magnan (2003) 
and Alsaeed (2006) who both found negative and insignificant relationships. Similarly, the findings 
for the PM/EID relationship, while not consistent with that of Roberts (1992), is consistent with a 
recent study by Chen and Kong (2011) who also found insignificant relationship with a negative 
coefficient. At a glance, we may attribute these inconsistencies to the fact that Roberts (1992) and 
Hossain et al. (1994) studies are dated and conducted on data from developed countries, some 
recent studies Yekini and Jallow (2012), Yekini et al. (2017) also found inverse but significant 
relationship between economic variables with the level of EID in the UK – a developed economy 
context. However, the plausible reason for an inverse relationship in the current study could be that 
most Chinese companies sampled are, generally, not influenced by their economic power in their 
decision to engage in or disclose environmental information which contradicts most extant 
literature on EID.    
Industrial classification and EID: Hypothesis 4 examined industry effect on the level of EID. 
Consistent with previous studies (Gamerschlag et al., 2010; Yekini and Jallow, 2012; Yekini et al., 
2015) the hypothesis is supported by the results. The results show a significant positive relationship 
at 1% level to EID. Suggesting that similar to developed economies, industry classification of listed 
Chinese companies also have significant effect on the level of EID, polluting industries tend to 
disclose more information on EID than non-polluting industries.  
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4.3. Additional analysis and robustness check 
Following our initial findings on the economic power variables, we subject our main findings in 
Table 7 to several robustness checks and additional analysis to enhance the reliability and rigour of 
our investigation; we present these in Table 8 Panels A and B below. In Table 8, we split our data 
into two on the basis of the stock exchange in which they are listed to see if this has any effect on 
the level of EID. Panel A presents the results for companies listed on the Shanghai stock exchange 
while Panel B presents results for companies listed on the Shenzhen stock exchange. The results in 
Panel A show that SOE has positive and significant effect on the level of EID while MAN and LEV 
have insignificant effect on the level of EID. IND has positive and significant effect on the level of 
EID which is consistent with the results reported in Table 7. The results in Panel B is fairly similar 
to that of Table 7 and all significant variables remained significant while insignificant variables 
remained insignificant. For instance, PM has negative and significant effect on the level of EID, 
which implies that companies listed in the Shenzhen stock exchange do not increase their EID level 
even when there is improved economic power. This confirms the fact that the guideline produced 
by the Shanghai stock exchange had a great impact on the EID level of the companies listed on it 
to the extent that they engage in and disclose environmental information regardless of their 
economic power, while the reverse is the case with the Shenzhen companies. 
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   We conduct several additional analyses to check the sensitivity of our results. First, in order to 
address the potential endogeneity issues that might arise from simultaneous relationship between 
ownership variables (SOE and MAN), economic power variables (LEV and PM), industry variable 
(IND) and the level of EID, we estimate lagged-effects model, where this year’s EID is influenced 
by previous year’s ownership, economic power, industry variables and control variables. The 
results shown in Model 10, 11 and 12 of Table 9 are similar to those reported in Model 1, 2 and 3of 
Table 7, therefore indicating that our findings are fairly robust to estimating a lagged structure.  
   In addition, we estimate a random-effect model to address the potential heterogeneity across 
firms. It is suggested that some unobserved firm-level specific factors can affect the level of EID 
that normal OLS estimation may not be able to fully address (Thomsen et al., 2006). To mitigate 
the effect of this concerns, Models of 1, 2 and 3 were re-estimated using random-effect and the 
results shown in Models 13, 14 and 15 of Table 9 are fairly consistent.  
  Finally, to further address the concern of potential endogeneity, Blundell and Bond (1998) 
suggest that GMM estimator can be used to mitigate this problem. The findings reported in Models 
16, 17 and 18 of Table 9 are consistent with those reported in Models 1, 2 and 3 of Table 7, 
suggesting that our findings are fairly robust to the presence of any possible endogeneity issues. To 
assess the validation of our findings, we conducted both second-order autocorrelation test AR (2) 
and Hansen test. Firstly, the AR (2) tests the null hypothesis of no second-order autocorrelation in 
residuals (Roodman, 2009). We find that AR (2) for all the models reported in Table 9 are 
insignificant, implying that the residuals in the equations are not serially correlated. Secondly, we 
use the Hansen test to test whether the model is over-identified (Roodman, 2009). The results of 
the Hansen test indicate that all the instruments are valid.  
 
[<<<<Table 9 about here>>>>] 
 
5 Conclusion 
This study explores the effect of the regulations issued by SEPA and the guideline issued by 
Shanghai Stock Exchange (SSE) to simplify the requirements of SEPA’s regulations on the level of 
Environmental Information Disclosures (EID) in the annual reports of Chinese listed companies. 
Using content analysis, the data was obtained from the annual reports of 100 Chinese companies 
over the period of 2014 to 2016 drawn from both the Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges, 
while the level of EID was measured using a scoring system.  
The findings show that the overall level of EID in China is still very low in non-SOEs 
compared to SOEs. Most disclosures contained simple description without implementation 
plans/schemes and projects. Disclosure of funds from government are very limited among sampled 
non-SOE firms, in addition, the average score of disclosure for technical support and waste disposal 
are low. The lower level of EID in China reflects lack of government and technical support 
especially for private enterprises. The findings revealed that ownership structure, industry and 
economic power are significantly related to EID. The SOEs disclose more EID, since government 
owned the major shares in the SOEs, and they represent the most powerful stakeholders compared 
with other creditors, so they have great influence on EID. Similarly, since polluted industries have 
more regulations from the government, they tend to disclose more information in line with 
legitimacy theory and to avoid punishments. Furthermore, the guidelines published by the Shanghai 
stock exchange also encouraged more disclosure.   
The findings from this study have a number of important implications for government, 
management of companies and other policy makers. Firstly, government should establish special 
environmental protection funds for non-SOEs, to help them conduct more environmental protection 
activities. For example, provide energy saving technology and apply it into company’s products to 
reduce energy usage; give sufficient funds for companies to establish professional environmental 
facilities to dispose sewage and other wastes. Secondly, government and policy makers should 
provide clear guidelines for EID by clearly defining what the content of EID should be and should 
carry out periodic audit on the report published by firms. Finally, government should not only 
monitor the performance of EID of polluted industries but also pay more attention on non-polluting 
industries.  
Management of listed companies also have an important role to play, they should think highly 
of their corporate strategies on environmental issues. For example, improve the environmental 
protection consciousness of their employees through regular training making them aware of the 
relationship between corporate sustainable development and environmental protection. 
Management needs to set a clear energy-saving and emission reduction targets for the company 
and ensure that this is reflected in the EID in their annual reports.  
Although the results of this study are robust, a number of limitations are identified as follows. 
Firstly, the scoring system may be subjective, future study may consider alternative ways to 
measure of EID. Secondly, we used leverage and profit margin as measures of economic power, 
future studies may consider other variables such as growth rate of revenue and return on equity. 
Thirdly, this study employed the quantitative approach and the data is mainly collected from 
company annual reports, future studies could consider using the qualitative approach, such as 
interviews, case studies, etc.  
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Figure 1: EID informed by the interlocking ideas of legitimacy and stakeholder theories. 
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Table 1: Distribution of samples in two stock exchanges 
Stock Exchange N Mean Std. deviation 
Shanghai (SH) 186 10.53 4.848 
Shenzhen (SZ) 114 9.43 4.819 
 
 
 
Table 2: Definition of independent variables 
Variables Definitions 
 
SOEs State Owned Enterprises (SOEs) is a measure of ownership structure. It is a 
dichotomous variable where, 1 equals, a firm is SOE and 0 otherwise. 
 
MAN 
 
MAN is a measure of managerial ownership. It is the percentage of all directors’ 
ownership to total firm ordinary shareholdings. 
 
LEV & PM 
 
Used as a combined measure of economic power. LEV is measured as a ratio of 
total debt to total asset, while PM is measured as the percentage of net profit to 
revenue. Both LEV and PM are used as combined measure of economic power, 
while LEV reflects the solvency and financial risk of a firm, PM reflects firm’s 
strategies on pricing and firm’s profitability. The combined variables therefore 
explain the economic status of the firm (see section 2 for further discussion and 
justification). 
 
IND 
 
Industry classification is a dichotomous variable with 1 representing firms 
classified as polluting companies by SEPA and 0 otherwise. 
 
SIZE 
 
The size of the company measured by the total assets of the company. 
 
AGE 
 
Age is the number of years since a company first listed on the Stock Exchange. 
 
ROA 
 
SE 
 
ROA is return on assets used as a proxy for corporate financial performance. 
 
It is a dichotomous variable where, 1 equals, a firm is listed on Shanghai Stock 
Exchange and 0 equals, a firm is listed on Shenzhen Stock Exchange.  
 
 
 
Table 3: Description of items 
Item Explanation 
 
ENPR Any expenditure associated with environmental protection 
TREI Any expenditure related to technical research and environmental investment 
FAC Construction of facilities on environmental protection 
WAS Recycle, disposal or reuse of waste 
GFS Government financial support related to environment 
ENPO Effectiveness of the implementation of the environmental policy published by 
government 
PO Policies and objectives on environment that are implemented by the company 
OTHER Other relevant information 
 
 
Table 4: Descriptive statistics 
 N Min Max Mean SD VAR 
ENPR 300 0 3 1.887 0.968 0.937 
TREI 300 0 3 1.507 1.117 1.247 
FAC 300 0 3 1.413 1.231 1.514 
WAS 300 0 3 1.290 0.946 0.896 
GFS 300 0 3 0.307 0.767 0.588 
ENPO 300 0 3 1.507 0.795 0.632 
PO 300 0 3 1.800 0.612 0.375 
OTHER 300 0 3 0.400 0.684 0.468 
 
 
 
 
Table 5: Descriptive statistic for continuous independent variables 
Variables Mean SD Min Max Skewness Kurtosis 
EID 10.11 4.858 0 24.00 0.238 -0.262 
MAN  0.039 0.138 0 0.946 4.610 24.393 
LEV (%) 51.21 18.954 5.950 92.480 -0.327 -0.663 
PM 0.064 0.109 -0.768 .389 -2.204 15.359 
SIZE(million) 94,039 296433 184.420 2405376 5.946 39.513 
AGE (yrs) 14.54 5.775 1 25 -0.604 -0.439 
ROA (%) 3.78 0.050 -0.265 .190 -0.642 5.524 
SE 0.62 0.486 0 1 -0.497 -1.765 
 
 
 
 
Table 6: Correlation analysis 
  SOE MAN LEV PM IND SIZE AGE ROA SE 
SOE 1         
MAN -.261** 1        
LEV 0.047 -0.147* 1       
PM -0.131* 0.061 
-
0.273** 1      
IND 0.109 -0.074 
-
0.302** 0.019 1     
SIZE 0.227** 
-
0.157** 0.496** 0.033 
-
0.223** 1    
AGE 0.135* 
-
0.421** 0.093 -0.065 0.097 0.019 1   
ROA -0.109 0.026 
-
0.406** 0.771** 0.05 -0.019 -0.04 1  
SE 0.211** 
-
0.306** 0.063 -0.141* 0.104 0.048 -0.07 
-
0.126* 1 
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). * Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level 
(2-tailed). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 7: Regression Results 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
 With SOE as main 
ID 
With MAN as 
Main ID 
With LEV&PM as 
Main IDs 
SOE 2.594***   
 (6.13)   
MAN 4.964** 3.540*  
 (2.94) (1.99)  
LEV -0.031* -0.042** -0.044** 
 (-2.26) (-2.95) (-3.07) 
PM -6.050* -7.158* -6.946* 
 (-2.17) (-2.43) (-2.35) 
IND 2.982*** 3.239*** 3.199*** 
 (7.17) (7.38) (7.26) 
LN_SIZE 1.755*** 1.980*** 1.949*** 
 (12.75) (14.07) (13.86) 
AGE 0.148*** 0.164*** 0.128*** 
 (3.89) (4.07) (3.53) 
ROA 0.135 -1.933 -2.878 
 (0.02) (-0.29) (-0.43) 
SE 0.356 0.707 0.377 
 (0.81) (1.54) (0.87) 
Constant -10.32*** -11.14*** -9.819*** 
 (-7.17) (-7.33) (-7.14) 
Adjusted R2 0.532 0.473 0.468 
F Value 38.87*** 34.67*** 38.67*** 
N 300 300 300 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 8: Robustness test 
Panel A: Regression Results of companies listed on Shanghai stock exchange 
 Model 4 Model 4a Model 5 Model 6 
 With SOE as main 
ID 
With SOE as 
main ID 
With Man as 
main ID 
With LEV&PM as 
main IDs 
SOE 2.172*** 2.130***   
 (4.23) (4.15)   
MAN 3.557  2.640  
 (1.15)  (0.82)  
LEV -0.012 -0.013 -0.018 -0.019 
 (-0.78) (-0.83) (-1.10) (-1.13) 
PM -0.086 -0.002 -0.963 -0.888 
 (-0.03) (-0.00) (-0.27) (-0.25) 
IND 2.679*** 2.722*** 2.685*** 2.717*** 
 (5.11) (5.20) (4.89) (4.97) 
LN_SIZE 1.686*** 1.686*** 1.893*** 1.890*** 
 (10.18) (10.17) (11.44) (11.43) 
AGE 0.188*** 0.177*** 0.205*** 0.196*** 
 (3.69) (3.54) (3.85) (3.76) 
ROA -17.63* -17.99* -19.36* -19.60* 
 (-1.99) (-2.03) (-2.09) (-2.12) 
Constant -10.12*** -9.891*** -10.81*** -10.62*** 
 (-5.69) (-5.59) (-5.83) (-5.78) 
     
Adjusted R2 0.538 0.554 0.513 0.511 
F Value     
27.94*** 
   31.68***     26.84***      31.26*** 
N 186 186 186 186 
t statistics in parentheses * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Panel B: Regression Results of companies listed on Shenzhen stock exchange 
 Model 7 Model 7a Model 8 Model 9 
 With SOE as 
main ID 
With SOE as 
main ID 
With Man as 
main ID 
With LEV&PM as 
main IDs 
SOE 2.677*** 2.358**   
 (3.69) (3.19)   
MAN 5.889**  4.680*  
 (2.81)  (2.14)  
LEV -0.094*** -0.093*** -0.122*** -0.118*** 
 (-3.77) (-3.62) (-4.80) (-4.60) 
PM -19.38*** -18.02** -22.47*** -21.06*** 
 (-3.63) (-3.29) (-4.03) (-3.74) 
IND 3.635*** 3.393*** 4.312*** 4.049*** 
 (5.46) (4.98) (6.37) (5.98) 
LN_SIZE 2.199*** 2.101*** 2.464*** 2.359*** 
 (9.01) (8.42) (9.98) (9.59) 
AGE 0.151* 0.0585 0.184** 0.106* 
 (2.57) (1.16) (3.00) (2.11) 
ROA 17.19 15.69 14.89 13.89 
 (1.98) (1.75) (1.62) (1.49) 
Constant -11.56*** -8.558*** -12.27*** -9.754*** 
 (-5.21) (-4.26) (-5.25) (-4.75) 
     
Adjusted R2 0.622 0.594 0.573 0.554 
F Value 21.64*** 22.15*** 20.35*** 22.24*** 
N 114 114 114 114 
t statistics in parentheses * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Table 9: Additional analysis 
 Model 10 Model 11 Model 12 Model 13 Model 14 Model 15 Model 16 Model 17 Model 18 
 With 
SOE as 
main ID 
With 
MAN as 
Main ID 
With 
LEV&PM 
as Main IDs 
With SOE as 
main ID 
With 
MAN as 
Main ID 
With 
LEV&PM 
as Main 
IDs 
With SOE 
as main ID 
With MAN 
as Main ID 
With 
LEV&PM 
as Main 
IDs 
SOE 2.445***   2.126**   1.474***   
 (4.72)   (2.64)   (4.91)   
MAN 5.014** 3.740  0.431** 0.230  9.594*** 10.169  
 (2.62) (1.87)  (2.41) (0.22)  (4.44) (1.25)  
LEV -0.031 -0.042* -0.044* -0.030** -0.030** -0.030** -0.100*** -0.093*** -0.100*** 
 (-1.84) (-2.42) (-2.50) (-2.81) (-2.83) (-2.84) (-7.64) (-3.65) (-8.59) 
PM -6.087 -7.016* -6.874* -0.471 -0.546 -0.539 -1.026 -0.827 -7.53*** 
 (-1.94) (-2.13) (-2.07) (0.31) (0.36) (0.35) (-1.49) (-1.50) (-3.13) 
IND 2.872*** 3.109*** 3.074*** 2.414** 2.600** 2.594** 2.575*** 2.488*** 2.301*** 
 (5.68) (5.86) (5.76) (3.03) (3.13) (3.12) (7.58) (7.52) (7.92) 
AGE 0.161*** 0.175*** 0.132** 0.451*** 0.484*** 0.485*** 0.533*** 0.527*** 0.537*** 
 (3.41) (3.53) (2.98) (8.58) (9.00) (9.17) (5.64) (5.90) (5.33) 
ROA 0.311 -1.887 -2.672 -1.739 -1.893 -1.834 -2.710 -3.574 -4.482 
 (0.04) (-0.24) (-0.34) (-0.46) (-0.50) (-0.49) (-0.26) (-0.45) (-0.15) 
LN_SIZE 1.698*** 1.921*** 1.886*** 1.559*** 1.614*** 1.610*** 2.528*** 2.369*** 2.425*** 
 (10.12) (11.32) (11.11) (7.97) (8.17) (8.15) (8.75) (8.17) (10.06) 
SE 0.297 0.618 0.266 0.586 1.027 1.010 1.724 2.769 2.895 
 (0.56) (1.12) (0.51) (0.72) (1.22) (1.21) (0.29) (0.35) (0.60) 
Constant -9.155*** -9.953*** -8.498*** -12.65*** -13.06*** -13.01*** -19.146*** -18.697*** -18.014*** 
 (-5.30) (-5.49) (-5.16) (-6.41) (-6.48) (-6.50) (-8.41) (-8.55) (-10.03) 
Adjusted R2 0.519 0.466 0.459 0.406 0.338 0.336    
AR (1) Test       0.000 0.001 0.001 
AR (2) Test       0.764 0.786 0.793 
Hansen Test       0.981 0.982 0.982 
N 200 200 200 300 300 300 300 300 300 
t statistics in parentheses * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.00
  
 
 
 
